In this paper we document the main features of the distributions of wages, earnings, consumption and wealth in Japan since the early 1980s using four main data sources: the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS), the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) and the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC). We present an empirical analysis of inequality that specifically considers the path from individual wages and earnings, to household earnings, after-tax income, and finally consumption. We find that household earnings inequality rose substantially over this period. Inequality in disposable income and in consumption also rose over this period but to a lesser extent, suggesting taxes and transfers as well as insurance channels available to households help to insulate household consumption from shocks to wages. We find the same pattern in inequality trends when we look over the life cycle of households as we do over time in the economy. Additionally we find that there are notable differences in the inequality trends for wages and hours between men and women over this period.
Introduction
Japan experienced a period of rapid economic growth and very low unemployment in the 1980s, followed by a severe contraction in the 1990s and continued stagnation throughout the 2000s.
This period, widely referred to as Japan's "lost decades", has been of considerable interest to international policy makers and the focus of macroeconomic research. The impact of the lost decades on Japanese households has received less attention in the academic literature. This paper examines the evolution of inequality in wages, earnings, disposable income and consumption during the boom years of the 1980s and the subsequent lost decades. We present a unified empirical analysis of inequality in Japan, both to help understand the patterns across these various measures within Japan and as a point of comparison with other advanced industrialized countries. 1 The contribution of this article relative to the existing literature is that we present a unified analysis of inequality trends in wages, hours, income, and consumption, documenting both the time series trends and the life cycle aspects of inequality. We examine both individuallevel inequality, separately for men and women, as well as household level inequality, unifying the analysis by means of the household budget constraint, which links individual wages, hours, taxes and transfers to household consumption expenditures.
We begin by summarizing our main findings. Looking first at individual wages during the lost decades, we find that the variance of log hourly wages remained roughly unchanged between 1991 and 2008 when calculated using all employed individuals. 2 This apparent stability, however, masks very different trends for men and women. Over this period wage inequality for men rose while it fell for women. When pooling all workers these trends cancel out in the aggregate.
Interestingly, although there is a decline in wage inequality for women, there is a sharp rise in hours inequality and the correlation between hours and wages, resulting in an overall rise in earnings inequality for women. Indeed the variance of log earnings for women is higher than for men over this entire period and increases more.
1 For this latter purpose we try as much as possible to present the facts in a manner that is directly comparable to other country studies. Specifically, we provide an analysis of inequality in Japan that is comparable with the analysis in the Review of Economic Dynamics special issue on Cross Sectional Facts for Macroeconomists, which includes analysis for the United States (Heathcote, Perri, and Violante, 2010) , Canada (Brzozowski, Gervais, Klein, and Suzuki, 2010) , the United Kingdom (Blundell and Etheridge, 2010) , Germany (Fuchs-Schuendeln, Krueger, and Sommer, 2010) , Italy (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010) , Spain (Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos, 2010) , Sweden (Domeij and Floden, 2010) , Russia (Gorodnichenko, Peter, and Stolyarov, 2010) , and Mexico (Binelli and Attanasio, 2010) .
2 Data availability limits the analysis of wages and hours to the period 1991 to 2008.
Moving from individuals to households, and again looking at the period 1991 to 2008, the rise in earnings inequality for men and women is mirrored by a rise in household earnings inequality.
Measured in terms of the variance of log household earnings, inequality increased from 0.246 to 0.284 (3.8 log points). During the same period inequality in consumption expenditures increased much less, seeing a rise in the variance of logs from 0.187 to 0.212 (2.6 log points). In addition, the earlier boom period from 1981 to 1991 saw an increase in household earnings inequality of 5.5 log points and household consumption inequality of 3.7 log points. In terms of yearly average increases, inequality increased more than twice as fast during the 1980s compared to the 1990s and 2000s.
We also consider the rise in inequality over the life cycle and document the same pattern in which household earnings inequality increases substantially with age, followed by a smaller increase for disposable income and even smaller increase for consumption expenditures. Furthermore, we document stark differences in life cycle profiles of wages, hours, and earnings between men and women and between younger and older cohorts.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the four data sets used for the analysis. Section 3 sets the analysis in the context of the macroeconomy and compares several aggregates computed from the survey data to those available in the national accounts.
In Sections 4 and 5 we consider first the inequality trends over time and next the evolution of inequality over the life cycle. In Section 6 we compare trends in earnings inequality calculated across the different data sets. Section 7 presents estimates of the variance of permanent and transitory shocks to wages. Section 8 documents what we can about trends in wealth inequality.
Section 9 concludes.
The data sets
In this section we describe the four micro data sets used. These are the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS), the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the National Survey of Family and Income Expenditure (NSFIE), and the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC).
Some additional details regarding sample selection and variable definitions are included in the Appendix.
Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS)
The BSWS is a cross sectional establishment survey conducted annually by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare. The survey has been conducted continuously since 1948;
however, we have access only to data for the period 1991-2008 for research purposes. The universe of the survey is private establishments with five or more regular employees and public establishments with 10 or more regular employees in Japan, except those classified in agriculture, forestry, fishery, and the legislative, administrative, and judicial branches of local and national The survey contains rich information on the earnings of household members, as well as household consumption expenditures; however, detailed information on monthly income is collected only if the household head is employed, but not if the household head is non-employed, selfemployed, executives, freelancers, farmers, foresters, and fishers. The household head is defined as a primary earner in the household. The data is collected by a combination of survey questions and a household diary in which households are requested to fill in daily expenditures. There is neither bottom nor top coding of income and consumption records.
National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE)
The National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) is a cross sectional household survey conducted every five years by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The survey was first conducted in 1959; however, only five recent waves (1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004) 
Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC)
The to be slightly older, implying the age range for men in the sample ranges from 25 to 57.
Sample selection
The four data sets just described each have their strengths and drawbacks. The BSWS is a large annual survey that provides detailed information on wages and hours at the individual 4 We exclude workers aged 60 or older as it is typical for companies in Japan to impose mandatory retirement at age 60. 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 . Pretax income per capita in the FIES is calculated as the weighted sum of household pretax income, divided by the weighted sum of household size. The employment rate in the FIES is calculated as the weighted sum of employed household members divided by the weighted sum of household members over the age of 15. The general trends in each series coincide between the SNA, FIES and NSFIE; however, the estimates based on the NSFIE and the FIES are all systematically below the SNA. This finding is consistent with Hayashi, Ando, and Ferris (1988) who compare the SNA68 and FIES in 1984.
Wages, hours and earnings In Figure 3 we plot mean wages, hours, and earnings by gender Consumption In Figure 4 , we compare two measures of per capita consumption calculated from the FIES and the NSFIE and contrast them with the National Accounts measures. In the left we plot non-durable consumption and in the right we plot durable consumption. Our measure of non-durable consumption based on the FIES and the NSFIE line up quite well, at least until the mid 1990s. They are, however, both approximately 50 percent below the National Accounts measures. For durable consumption, the FIES measure is below both the NSFIE and the National Accounts measures. Despite the difference in levels, the trends in the survey data appear to align quite well with the trends in the National Accounts. Both the income and the expenditure survey data appear to suffer from under reporting or possibly an under sample of high income households. The under representation of income and especially consumption expenditures in survey data relative to national accounts data is common in most countries, and it does not appear to be much worse for Japan than it is for the United States and the United Kingdom (see Heathcote, Perri, and Violante 2010; Blundell and Etheridge 2010 4 Inequality over time
Individual-level inequality
Wages We begin our discussion of inequality by considering the dispersion of individual wages, hours and earnings. We draw on material in Yamada and Kawaguchi (2012) for some of the results on the wage structure. It is particularly instructive to consider separately men and women when looking at the evolution of wage inequality as they have experienced very different patterns in the evolution of wage inequality between 1991 and 2008. In Figure 5 we plot four measures of inequality in hourly wages for male and female workers separately and pooled. The variance of log wages for all workers appears to indicate that wage inequality remained basically unchanged over this period. However, once we look separately at men and women it becomes clear that this is the result of averaging over rising inequality for men and declining inequality for women. The same pattern is true if we look at the Gini coefficient: inequality appears to be increasing slightly when looking at all workers while male wage inequality is rising and female wage inequality is falling. 5 A similar difference in trends is observed when looking at quantile ratios for men and women. The 50/10 ratio is rising for men and declining for women, although with an initial fall for men between 1991 and 1994 and an initial rise for women between 1991 and 1997. The ratio for all workers is declining, reflecting the fact that women are overrepresented in the bottom half of the wage distribution. Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yamada (2012) find that a steady rise in the minimum wage over this period accounts for a substantial share of the fall in the 50/10 ratio for women, who make up the majority of minimum wage workers. Looking at inequality at the top of the wage distribution we see that, with the exception of a fall between 1991 and 1995 for women, the 90/50 ratio is increasing for both men and women.
Observables and residuals The trends in the wage premium for education, measured at the ratio of mean wages for college educated relative to less than college educated workers once again differ for men and women. 6 Consistent with rising inequality for men and falling inequality for women, the education premium rose for men and fell for women over this period, and appear to have converged by 2002, by which point educated men and women have wages 1.4 times that of uneducated men and women. However, the pooled premium is 1.5, reflecting differences in relative educational attainment and wages between men and women. Over the same period the raw gender differential fell from 1.89 to 1.74, a substantial decline, but still much higher in levels compared to the US or UK which have a raw gender differential of 1.3 by 2005 (Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; Heathcote, Perri, and Violante, 2010) . The experience premium, measured as average wages of 45-55 year olds relative to 25-35 year olds, changed little over this period.
What is striking once again is the substantial difference between men and women, and the fact that the experience premium for women is actually less than one, a pattern observed in the UK (Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; Heathcote, Perri, and Violante, 2010) . Residual inequality is plotted in the bottom right panel. This is the residual for all, male or female workers, after controlling for demographics including age, education, sex, and part-time job. The pooled residual variance ranges between 0.16 and 0.18 while the raw variance ( Figure 5 ) ranges between 0.3 and 0.33, indicating that observables account for about one half of the variance over this period.
Labor supply In the bottom right panel of Figure 7 we plot the variance of log earnings for men and women. In contrast to the inequality trends in wages, inequality in earnings rose for both men and women between 1991 and 2008. 7 Since earnings are the product of wages and hours, the variance of log earnings can be decomposed into the variance of log wages plus the variance of log hours plus twice their covariance. The other three panels of the same figure plot the variance of log wages, log hours, and their correlation. For women, the decline in the variance of log wages is offset by a larger rise in the variance of log hours, and a positive correlation between the two. For men, the variance is rising for both log wages and hours, and is muted slightly by a negative correlation. 8
Earnings In Figures 8 and 9 we dig deeper into the sources of the change in earnings inequality for men and women. We rank individuals by earnings, and then for the bottom, middle and top deciles of the earnings distribution we calculate mean earnings, wages and hours worked separately by sex. To highlight the dynamics we plot the percentage change for each decile relative to 1991.
For both men and women, the pattern for earnings is the same: the top decile remained unchanged in real terms between 1991 and 2008; the middle decile experienced a small decline of less than one percent, and the bottom decile experienced a real decline of five percent. Over this period wages for men remained virtually unchanged in the three deciles, and only women in the bottom decile experienced any real wage rise of about four percent, reflecting the steady rise in the minimum wage over this period (Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yamada, 2012 Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yokoyama 2008 ) the reconciliation of the trends in female wage and earnings inequality through the trends in hours inequality and the increased correlation between hours and wages has not previously been documented. is happening to the distribution that is not fully conveyed in the summary measures of Figure   10 .
Household-level inequality
In Figure 11 we plot the 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90 and 95th percentiles of equivalized household earnings were rising at all percentiles of the distribution. However, not everyone experienced growth at the same rate. While the 95th percentile experienced real household earnings growth of 40 log points, the 5th percentile grew by 18 log points. All incomes were rising, but those at the top experienced substantially larger gains, leading to a rise in overall inequality. The years post 1996 tell a very different story. During this period households above the median experienced zero real growth in household earnings, while those at and below the median experienced real declines. The 5th, 10th and 25th percentiles experienced declines of 10 log points, while the median experienced declines of 5 log points. Thus, the increases in inequality over this period reflect a stagnation for half the population and real declines for the other half. To summarize, during the years 1981 to 1996, real earnings rose at all percentiles of the distribution, but not equally across the percentiles, while from 1996 to 2008 households above the median experienced no real growth, while households at and below the median experienced real declines in earnings.
This important distinction is masked in the inequality summary measures presented in Figure   10 . From individual to household inequality The top panels of Figure 12 plots the evolution of inequality in earnings for the entire household and for the household head. The level of inequality is higher for (equivalized) household earnings than for earnings of the head. At least part of this is due to the fact that households comprising an extended family are quite common in Japan (see Table 1 ). With multiple adults living in the same household, the potential for inequality in earnings across households is greater; we are pooling over households in which all the adults work and households in which only one adult works. Although the level is higher, the trend is nearly identical when considering the earnings of the head only of the equivalized household earnings.
The bottom left panel of Figure 12 plots the proportion of two-earner households, which has and displays a slight U-shape over this period. The fact that the spousal correlation in earnings is so low explains why the household inequality is not rising faster than inequality in the head's earnings.
Government redistribution In Figure 13 we consider the impact on inequality of government transfers and taxes. In the top panel we compare households' market income (gross income defined as earnings plus private transfers and asset income) to households market income plus government transfers (pretax income). In the bottom panel we compare income including gov- drifts away from inequality in income after government transfers. Given the fact that households comprising an extended family are quite common in Japan, government transfers consist mainly of public pension benefits, making it ambiguous whether government transfers reduce inequality.
The fact that the compression is larger for the variance of log income than for the Gini tells us that government transfers act to compress inequality at the bottom as the variance of log income is very sensitive to changes near zero. This finding is consistent with the results in Oshio (2006) who documents rising earnings inequality from 1980 to 2001 and finds evidence of inequality reducing transfers across households using the Survey of Income Redistribution. Looking at the bottom panels, we see that the tax system in Japan is quite progressive, and has a much larger effect on compressing inequality than transfers (either private or public). The effect of taxes in reducing inequality is quite stable over the entire period 1981 to 2008, as there is no discernible difference in the inequality trends when comparing pretax and disposable household incomes. 11
Looking again at Figure 11 and comparing the percentiles of household earnings to disposable income we see that taxes and benefits provide substantial redistribution over this period.
Looking, for example, at 2005, government redistribution raises the disposable income of the 5th percentile 5 log points above household earnings, reduced the 95th percentile by 10 points and leaves the 10th percentile effectively unchanged from pre-government earnings.
From disposable income to consumption In Figure 14 we explore the role of borrowing and savings as a means for households to separate consumption expenditures from income. Here we plot for disposable income and non-durable consumption expenditures the variance of logs, the Gini coefficient, the 50/10 and 90/10 rations. There are several interesting things to note about the variance of logs. First, for the most part inequality in consumption expenditures is lower than inequality in disposable income, consistent with access to at least partial insurance at the household level. Second, the trends differ somewhat between income and consumption.
There are three distinctive episodes for income: rising inequality between 1981 and 1990; no change in inequality between 1990 and 2000; and then rising inequality again during the 2000s.
In contrast, inequality in consumption has risen steadily during the entire period.
In the same panel we also plot the evolution of the covariance between disposable income and consumption. From 1981 to 1989 the variances of log income and consumption, as well as their covariance all increase roughly in parallel. During the 1990s, however, the variance of log consumption continues to rise, while the variance of disposable income and the covariance with consumption flattens out. Finally, during the 2000s, the variance of disposable income increases faster than consumption, which continues to rise at roughly the same rate as the previous decades, and the covariance again rises roughly in parallel with consumption.
The flattening out of the covariance despite the continual rise in the variance of consumption is quite interesting. One story that is consistent with these patterns is as follows. The variance of permanent shocks to income has been essentially constant over this period, and is reflected in the roughly constant rise in consumption variance (see Blundell and Preston (1998) 5 Inequality over the life cycle
Our ultimate interest is in the life cycle profile of inequality for households. As noted earlier we can think of households as having access to multiple forms of insurance, one of which is due to the collecting of individuals into households. Since the vast majority of households will comprise at least one man and one woman, it is worth documenting the raw differences in employment rates, wages, hours and earnings by gender, which differ strikingly in Japan. Of course these differences largely reflect the outcome of decisions made at the household level.
Average employment, wages and hours over the life cycle Figure 15 plots the employment rates for men and women over the life cycle for the 10-year intervals 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005 from the LFS. The differences by gender and the trends over time are quite striking. The employment rate for prime age (25 to 55) males in Japan ranges between 88 and 97 percent.
It has been falling somewhat over time, but always remains above 92 percent for men over the age of 30. Over the same period the employment rate for women never goes above 72 percent.
The life cycle pattern of fertility is also clear. The age profile of wages also differs markedly between men and women. In Figure 16 we plot the age profile for mean wages and hours for men and women by decade of birth. For men, wages rise between the age of 25 and 50 before declining slightly. For women, wages rise mildly from age 25 but peak by age 30, at which time they begin to fall slightly. There are similar gender differences in the age pattern for mean hours worked (conditional on employment). In the bottom left panel we plot average monthly hours for men by birth cohort. In each cohort we observe a decline in average hours after age 25. The level shift down at the beginning of each age profile corresponds to the year 1993 and reflects the change in legislation governing maximum working hours. Average hours for women are everywhere lower than for men, and tend to decline faster with age.
Inequality in wages and hours over the life cycle Figures 17 and 18 plot the age profile for the variance of log wages, hours, earnings and the correlation between hours and wages by decade of birth and separately for men and women. In the upper left panel of Figure 17 we plot the age profile for the variance of log wages for men. The increase in the variance of log wages is roughly linear between ages 25 and 59. This pattern is consistent with a permanent transitory stochastic process for wages in which the variance of the permanent shock is roughly constant with age (see the discussion in Section 7). We formally estimate such a process in Section 7 below. In the top right panel we plot the variance of log hours. The variance of hours also rises with age. The bottom left panel plots the correlation between hours and wages. The correlation is everywhere negative, but becoming increasing less so with age. The combination of the age profiles of the variances of log wages and log hours and of their correlation produce the increasing age profiles for the variance of log earnings, which appear to have a slightly convex shape. Figure 18 plots the same age profiles for women. The stark gender differences in the age profiles for employment rates, average wages and average hours ( Figure 16 ) carry over to the variances. In the top left panel we plot the age profile for the variance of log wages. From age 25 to 35 we observe the same linear rise as we do with men, although much steeper. The variance then flattens out between age 35 and 40 and declines slightly through age 60. Taken at face value, this pattern is consistent with a stochastic process for wages in which the persistence of the shocks is high up to age 35, becomes less persistent during the late 30s and appears to be mostly transitory after the age of 40. It is, however, important to keep in mind that these are raw profiles and no attempt has been made to control for selection into employment. We plot the age profile for the variance of log hours in the top right panel. The rise with age is substantially greater than it is for men. The correlation between hours and wages is plotted in the bottom left panel. In contrast with the profile for men, the correlation for women is mostly Var. of log Equivalized (control for cohort effects) Figure 19 : Life-cycle inequality: controlling for time and cohort effects (FIES) positive after age 30 and hump-shaped. Finally, turning to the bottom right panel, we see that taking the age profiles of wages and hours together produces age profiles for earnings which are strictly increasing, and appear to be concave.
Cohort versus time effects Separating out cohort or year effects in the age profile is difficult given the linear dependence between age year and year of birth. What is clear from looking at the variance of log earnings for men and women in the bottom right panels of Figures 17 and 18 is that younger cohorts experience higher inequality than older cohorts; the variance of log earnings is higher at every age when comparing a younger to an older cohort. Figure 19 illustrates the implications for the age profile of the variance of household earnings, disposable income and consumption expenditures when controlling for either year effects or cohort effects and normalized to zero at age 25. When we control for year effects, the age-profiles are about one third less steep than when we control for cohort effects.
Equivalizing and the curvature of age profiles In the analysis of household-level inequality, whether or not we work with raw or equivalized household income and consumption has a major effect on both the total increase in inequality over the life-cycle and on the shape of the profile. Looking at the left hand panels, the total increase in the variance of household earnings is 20 percent higher when we do not equivalize. Additionally, the age profile for household earnings is linear (or mildly convex) when using the raw data, but becomes convex when using equivalized data. Looking at the consumption profile, when using raw household consumption expenditures the variance is essentially flat until age 40 (with a small decline between 25 and 30), then rises until age 50, and becomes flat again after age 50. When we look at equivalized consumption expenditures, the profile is slightly different. The variance declines between age 25 and 35 (during the time most individuals are getting married and having children), it then remains flat until the early or mid 40s at which time the variance begins to rise, and continues to rise until age 55.
A striking feature of the age profile of consumption in Japan is that regardless of whether we use the raw data or equivalized data, or control for year or cohort effects, the age profile is convex. This suggests that uncertainty about permanent differences across households is only revealed later in life. Ohtake and Saito (1998) attribute this convexity to the fact that within the traditional Japanese firm promotions occur relatively late in a worker's career so uncertainty about permanent differences is not resolved until quite late in life. This idea, however, is somewhat at odds with the evidence on wages presented in Figure 17 . Here the variance of log wages increases linearly with age for men, although it is worth noting that the variance of log earnings does appear to be convex. Therefore, much of the explanation for the convex age profile for the variance of consumption must come through the endogenous response of hours, combined with the earnings process for women, and the demographics in the household. 
Comparison across data sets
Earnings in the BSWS, FIES and NSFIE The analysis in this paper has drawn on several different data sets in order to obtain a complete picture of inequality in individual wages, hours, and earnings, and in household earnings, disposable income and consumption expenditures. As discussed in Section 2 these data sets do not all cover the same time periods, and the population who is sampled differs to some extent across data sets. In addition, there is very little overlap in the information available in all three datasets. Indeed, the only variable that exists in all three data sets is individual earnings.
Life cycle profiles of earnings To gauge how consistent the data sets are with each other we plot in Figure 20 the age profile and time-series for the variance of log earnings, controlling for year or cohort effects and normalized to zero at age 25, and separately for men and women.
Looking at the left hand panels where we control for year effects, the profiles for both men and women line up quite well in all data sets. The cumulative increase in earnings inequality for men is effectively the same when calculated on any of the three datasets. For women there is more discrepancy between the surveys. For women, the age profile based on the BSWS and the NSFIE line up very well with each other, while the profile estimated from the FIES lies well below these two. However, this discrepancy can be reconciled once we account for the different sample selection of the surveys; the FIES excludes single person households. The age profiles estimated on the FIES and the NSFIE excluding single person household line up very closely.
The inclusion or exclusion of single men does not have a noticeable impact on the age profile.
The right hand panels repeat this exercise controlling for cohort effects. There are now substantial differences across datasets in terms of the estimated age profiles. The slope of the earnings profile for men based on the BSWS is more than twice that based on the NSFIE or FIES. A similar pattern holds for women. In addition, excluding single women from the NSFIE data does not reconcile the differences between the NSFIE and FIES profiles. It appears that the estimated age profiles are much more stable when we control for year rather than cohort effects. The difference between the BSWS and FIES profiles for men is quite striking, and seems to reflect the fact that the BSWS data is missing the boom period of the 1980s.
Time-series for earnings inequality In Figure 21 we plot inequality in individual earnings relative to 1994 based on each data set over time. There are few discrepancies between the time-series of individual earnings inequality calculated from the three data sets. Figure 21 : Comparing the evolution of earnings inequality across data sets
Wage dynamics
To shed further light on the stochastic process faced by households we specify and estimate a standard permanent-transitory income process. We focus on the process for male wages. It is reasonable to interpret the stochastic process for male wages as a close representation to the productivity process. As we have already seen that the life cycle profile for the variance of households earnings looks very close to the profile for male earnings or wages. Alternatively, we could model the stochastic process for household earnings or disposable income. However, incorporating women's complicated age profiles for employment, wages and hours as well as accounting for extended family members would add prohibitive complexity for little gain.
Statistical model Let w ict be the residual log wage for individual i of cohort c at date t. We estimate a permanent-transitory process of the form
where ε ict and η ict are uncorrelated, iid across individuals, with mean zero and variances σ εt and σ ηt . These variances are assumed to vary over time, but not by cohort.
Methodology We can estimate the time series of the variances of the permanent and the transitory shocks using either first differences or levels. In differences we have
From this we can form the following moments:
Alternatively we can form moments using the level equation: and we have the following moment restrictions with which to estimate the variances of the permanent and transitory shock:
Findings Estimating a model of wage dynamics obviously requires panel data. For this we use the JPSC, which is the only available panel data in Japan. As discussed in Section 2.4 the JPSC started in 1993 and is available through 2007. Since the sample only began in 1993 and is based on cohorts of young women, the data will not be representative of the population. The age range of the women in the sample, looking over all years, is 25 to 48. We use data on wages of the husbands of these women where we have an age range of 25 to 57. Figure 22 plots the estimated variances of permanent and transitory shocks based on the moments in both differences and levels. There are some differences in the estimates between the two methodologies. The mean of variances of the permanent shock are estimated to be slightly higher when using differences than when using levels. Additionally, there is somewhat more year-to-year volatility in the levels estimates. Indeed, in three of the years the variance is estimated to be slightly negative using the moments in levels. That said, the time trend appears to be flat using either methodology. The rise in inequality observed in the time series does not appear to be the result of a rise in the variance of permanent shock to wages. We do not observe a substantial increase in the estimated variance of transitory shocks either, although there is a slight upward trend.
The mean of the estimated variance of permanent shocks is 0.0078 using differences and 0.0059 using levels. In terms of the implied rise in the variance of log earnings over a 35 year working life, these estimates correspond to a rise in the variance of log wages of 0.274 and 0.205.
The rise over the life cycle in the variance of log wages calculated using the BSWS is 0.316 when controlling for cohort effects and 0.219 when controlling for year effects (based on the data presented in Figure 17 ). The life cycle increase in the variance of log wages implied by our estimates of the variance of permanent shocks lie between these. 12
The estimates of the variance of permanent shocks presented above and the linear increase with age in the variance of log earnings both suggest that the variance of permanent and transitory shocks faced by individuals have been quite stable over this period, while the variance of the transitory shock appears to be increasing slightly. At the same time we observe a rise in the variance of earnings, disposable income, and consumption over the same period. A possible explanation is the changing age distribution in Japan over this period. Between 1980s and 2000s the distribution of age of household heads moved substantially to the right (see Table 1 ). Since the variance of log earnings is increasing linearly with age, and more weight is being given to older ages in the later years, the overall variance will naturally rise reflecting the aging of the population. 13
An exploratory look at wealth
Before concluding we present some evidence on the time trends and age profiles of wealth in Japan. The wealth data is taken from the NSFIE which, while not comprehensive, provides a partial view of wealth over this period. The NSFIE has information on financial assets and liabilities. Information on real wealth is limited to the value of durable goods including furniture,
12 While the average variance of permanent shocks is broadly consistent when we estimate using either the levels or differences, there is evidence that the permanent-transitory process is misspecified: the estimated variance is negative for 1996, 2003, 2004 in levels and for 2005 in differences.
13 Yamada and Kawaguchi (2012) demonstrate that a change in the composition of the workforce, as a result of progress in higher education and a decline in youth population, is a key factor in widening wage inequality in recent years. 
Concluding remarks
This paper documents the various aspects of economic inequality in Japan during the boom times of the 1980s and during the 1990s and 2000s, the so called lost decades. We show that wage inequality rose for men but actually fell for women over this period. At the same time, inequality in hours worked rose substantially for women, resulting in rising earnings inequality for both men and women. This rise was mirrored by a rise in household earnings inequality.
The rise in earnings inequality is muted somewhat by the tax and transfer system, as such inequality in disposable income rose less. The rise in inequality for disposable income was further mitigated within households and we document that the rise in consumption inequality is substantially lower than earnings inequality. These same patterns are also apparent when we consider the evolution of inequality over the life cycle. The lifetime rise in consumption inequality is substantially lower than the lifetime rise in earnings inequality (although the degree of the difference depends somewhat on whether we control for year or cohort effects and whether we look at raw or equalized variables).
Finally, we note that there have been substantial differences in the trends for wage inequality for men and women, as well as substantial differences in labor supply responses. It would seem that further exploration of the interaction within these households may be fruitful in shedding further light on the exact mechanisms individuals use to separate desired consumption from realized income shocks. Taxes include income taxes (070), residence taxes (075), other direct taxes (071), and premiums for social security including public pension (073), public health insurance (074), public nursing care insurance (077), and other social insurance (076). Non-durable consumption is expenditure on the following items: food (1); repair and maintenance of houses (2.2); fuel, light and water charges (3); domestic utensils, non-durable goods, and services (4.4, 4.5, 4.6); clothing and footwear (5); medical care (6); transportation and communication (7), excluding purchase of vehicles and bicycles (7.2.1, 7.2.2); education (8); culture and recreation (9), excluding recreational durable goods (9.1); and other consumption expenditure (10), excluding remittance (10.4). All these variables are deflated by the consumer price index with the base year of 2010.
The survey months of the FIES can differ across households. Therefore, monthly income and consumption are calculated by taking their average over the survey period, after partialling out the effect of seasonality by running the regression on year dummies and month dummies.
Household income and consumption are equivalized using the OECD scale.
Comparison with National Accounts The original sample is used when compared with the National Accounts. Pretax income is annual household income including regular earnings, temporary earnings, and bonuses, earnings from a side job at home, business income, income from agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, social security benefits, other income, personal consumption of agricultural and other commodities of the household head and other household members. Non-durable consumption is expenditure on non-durables and services, and durable consumption is expenditure on durables and semi-durables, according to the classification by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
For the National Accounts measures, pretax income is calculated by subtracting the employer's contribution to social security from the sum of wages and salaries, mixed income, property income, and social benefits other than social transfers in kind in the SNA93. Non-durable consumption is expenditure on non-durables and services minus imputed rents, and durable consumption is expenditure on durables and semi-durables in the SNA93.
A3. National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) 1984 (NSFIE) , 1989 (NSFIE) , 1994 (NSFIE) , 1999 (NSFIE) , and 2004 Sample The original sample comprises 296,827 households, including both multiple-person and single-person households. Of them, 290,457 households responded the survey every month. All households are surveyed in autumn in the NSFIE. Therefore, monthly income and con-sumption are calculated by simply taking their average over the survey period for each household.
Household income, consumption, and wealth are equivalized using the OECD scale.
Comparison with National Accounts The original sample is used when compared with the National Accounts. Variable definitions for income and consumption in the NSFIE are the same as in the FIES. Monthly consumption is converted to annual consumption by multiplying a factor calculated from the FIES to take into account seasonality. 
A5. Comparability of data
The BSWS is an establishment survey that has no information on employees' families, while neither the FIES nor the NSFIE collect information on hours worked. Variables that can be compared across the three data sets are only individual earnings. Individual earnings in the FIES and the NSFIE are earnings of either household heads or their spouses who are aged 25 to 59. Female earnings are constructed from the FIES only after 1987, however, since the FIES did not contain information on spousal age before 1987. The FIES and NSFIE samples include the spouse of the household head regardless of occupation, while the BSWS sample includes workers regardless of family structure, though not including workers in very small establishments.
15 All the results using the JPSC data are drawn from an earlier version of the paper by Lise and Yamada (2012) .
